To remove key escrow problem and avoid the need of secure channel in ID based cryptosystem Lee et al. [1] proposed a secure key issuing protocol. However we show that it suffers from impersonation, insider attacks and incompetency of the key privacy authorities. We also cryptanalyze Sui et al. 's[2] separable and anonymous key issuing protocol.
System Setup
The KGC specifies two cyclic groups G 1 , G 2 of prime order q where G 1 is additive and G 2 is multiplicative groups. It also defines a bilinear mapping as e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 between G 1 , G 2 and hash functions H : {0, 1}
* → G 1 , h : G 2 → Z * q . Let P ∈ G 1 be an arbitrary generator of G 1 . The KGC selects a master key s 0 ∈ Z * q at random and computes its pubic key P 0 = s 0 P .
System Public Key Setup
The n KPAs establish their key pairs. KP A i chooses his master key s i and computes his public key P i = s i P ,∀i = 1, ..., n. Then all KPAs cooperate sequentially and computes
..s n P is published as system public key. This sequential process can be verified by e(Y ′ i , P ) = e(Y ′ i−1 , P i ).
Key Issuing
A user with ID chooses a random secret x, computes a blinding factor X = xP and requests the KGC to issue a partial private key by sending X, ID. Then the KGC issues a blinded partial private key as follows.
1. Checks the identification and computes the public key of the user as Q ID = H(ID, KGC, KP A 1 , ..., KP A n ). The user can unblind Q ′ 0 using his knowledge of x, since h(e(s 0 X, P 0 ))=h(e(s 0 xP, P 0 )) = h(e(P 0 , P 0 )
Computes a blinded partial private key as
x ).
Key Securing
The user requests KP A i (i = 1, ..., n) sequentially to provide key privacy service by sending ID, X, Q 
This process is carried out up to KP A n . Finally user receives Q ′ n .
Key Retrieving
The user retrieves his private key S ID by unblinding Q ′ n as follows.
The user can verify the correctness of his private key by e(S ID , P ) = e(Q ID , Y ).
Cryptanalysis of Lee et al.'s Protocol

Impersonation Attack
In Key Issuing phase, user sends X = xP and ID to the KGC. Any active adversary can modify the X as X * = x * P and still it cannot be detected by KGC. Because there is no binding between the ID and X. Then KGC computes partial private key Q * 0 = h(e(s 0 X * , P 0 ))s 0 Q ID , and sends to the user through public channel. Adversary can eavesdrop Q * 0 and request the KPAs for key privacy service. At the end Adversary can extract the private key by unblinding Q * n .
Insider Attack
In Key Securing phase, user requests KP A i to provide key privacy service by sending ID, X, Q Now, KP A i−1 has Q * i = h(e(s i X * , P i ))s i rH(m) and he can extract the signature of KP A i on m as h(e(P i , P i )
Incompetency of KPAs
In Key Securing Phase, the user requests KP A i (i = 1, 2, ..., n) sequentially to provide key privacy service by sending ID, X, Q It may be noted that the user is not checking the correctness of the received parameters in intermediate stages. Therefore any modification by an Adversary during the communication between user and KP A i will be undetected till the end of Key Securing Phase. This requires the user to execute this phase again from the beginning. Further, as the KGC and KPAs are not capable of checking the validity of the received parameters, they are signing them blindly.
The attack given in Section 2.1 can also be applied to [3] .
Review of Sui et al. [2]
A one time password pwd can be established between the Local Registration Authority(LRA) and the user after the off-line authentication. Setup(run by KGC): It takes the security parameter k and returns params (System Parameters) and the master-key. Let G be a GDH group of prime order p. Public information is I SAKI = (G, p, H, P P KG ). P is a generator of G and H : 0, 1 * → G is a oneway hash function and Q A = H(id A ). P P KG = sP is the system public key. Key Generation: It takes inputs as params, master-key, and an arbitrary ID ∈ {0, 1} * ; and returns a private key S ID . The password pwd is user's chosen password during off-line authentication and the tuple (ID, pwd) is stored in KGC's database of "pending private key".
Insider Attack
In practice, it is likely that a user uses same password to access several systems and other purposes for his convenience. In the registration phase, the user gives his password pwd to LRA and the LRA stores the ID and corresponding password in the database. In the extended scheme given to remove the key escrow by single KGC, the database is accessible by multiple KGC's and LRA. Any one of the insider of the system could impersonate user's login on stealing password and can get access of the other systems.
Incompetency of KGCs
A user requests for private key as follows:
• Selects a random number r, and computes Q = rH(ID), T = r −1 H(password) and sends to the KGC.
• KGC checks the validity of the request by checking the equality e(Q, T ) = e(H(ID), H(password)).
• Computes blinded private key S = sQ and sends to the user where s is the KGC's private key.
• Then user verifies S by checking the equality e(S, P ) = e(Q, P pub ) where P pub = sP is KGC's public key.
Any Adversary can alter the parameters Q, T and replace with Q * = r * Q, T * = r * −1 T and KGC verifies the equality e(Q * , T * ) = e(H(ID), H(password)). Then the KGC computes S * = sQ * and sends to the user. In this protocol the KGC cannot check the validity of the parameters received and thus blindly signs on it.
